

653 A. Clearly not. If the cost of service were actually higher in the City than outside the City,  
654 then higher prices for City ratepayers might be justifiable. However, it is clear from  
655 reviewing just a few pieces of general information in the paragraphs below that  
656 distribution cost of service is a lot lower for most residential consumers in the City than  
657 for residential ratepayers outside the City. Information that demonstrates the lower cost  
658 of service for low-use consumers includes a potentially better residential load factor  
659 inside the City, higher density inside the City than outside the City, and older distribution  
660 equipment inside the City. (Unfortunately, all these cost differences cannot be reduced to  
661 a single, simple number because of the lack of ComEd data.)

662 **Q. Looking at the cost drivers you identified earlier, what is efficiency of electricity use**  
663 **and why does this matter?**

664 A. The efficiency of consumer use of electricity can generally be measured by the load  
665 factor. Annual load factor is defined as average usage per hour over the course of a year  
666 divided by usage at the time of ComEd's system peak. It is a measure of how even  
667 (steady) consumer usage is relative to the peak ComEd's facilities must serve. Load  
668 factor is proportionally (but inversely) related to cost of service, meaning that a 10%  
669 increase in load factor is associated with a 10% decrease in cost of service, when cost of  
670 service is measured on a per kWh basis, like the price data discussed above. If low use is  
671 correlated with high load factor – something I believe to be the case but have not been  
672 able to demonstrate without analyzing ComEd's load research data -- then low use  
673 consumers should see lower revenue per kWh prices. Inverted block rate or charge  
674 designs can achieve that relationship.

675

676 **Q. Can you summarize the efficiency of electricity use for different usage sub-groups of**  
677 **residential consumers?**

678 **A.** Unfortunately I have not been able to do so at this time. The City requested detailed raw  
679 data for the consumers that ComEd tracks to gather the data it uses to compute the peak  
680 load for the aggregate residential class. Those data were received too late to be analyzed  
681 and addressed in this testimony. With the requested data, I will be able to compute  
682 (among other things) the load factor by usage level, as well as by region. Then I should  
683 be able to answer this question about efficiency of use. When I looked at the issue in the  
684 past, low use City consumers had a markedly better load factor than high use consumers.  
685 I plan to provide additional analyses in supplemental or rebuttal testimony.

686 **Q. Why does consumer density matter in measuring the cost of delivery service?**

687 **A.** When ratepayer populations are denser, that is, more closely packed in a geographic area,  
688 the number of poles, the amount of primary wire, and the amount of secondary wire  
689 required to provide service to that area are reduced on a per ratepayer basis. Thus, the  
690 geographic density of a consumer population has a large impact on ComEd's costs of  
691 service. ComEd provided data on the number of distribution miles by region, which  
692 demonstrates that the two City Regions (not surprisingly) have a higher density than any  
693 of the other ComEd areas. Recall that these regions also had the lowest usage per  
694 ratepayer and the highest price per ratepayer.

695

**STATE OF ILLINOIS**

**ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION**

**COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY**

**Tariff filing to present the Illinois Commerce Commission with an opportunity to consider Revenue neutral tariff changes related to rate Design authorized by subsection 16-108.5(e) of the Public Utilities Act**

Docket. 13-0387

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. BODMER  
ON BEHALF OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO AND THE CITIZENS UTILITY BOARD**

**CITY/CUB EXHIBIT 2.0**

**SEPTEMBER 11, 2013**

**ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED BY COMED**

**Q. Several ComEd witnesses spend many pages addressing various issues in your testimony. Did their testimony cover the important issues in this case?**

A. No. First, as I noted earlier, ComEd has provided no substantive rebuttal to my demonstration of the strong correlation between consumer usage levels and ComEd's distribution costs, which ComEd admits are driven by demand.

Second, a large part of my cost of service analysis involved the cost responsibility of different regions that is driven by density, age of equipment and undergrounding. I spent much of my testimony discussing the fact that higher density, older equipment and less undergrounding are correlated with low usage, using City consumers as a proxy for low use consumers.<sup>1</sup> As an example of the cost drivers, I showed that the cost responsibility in terms of miles of lines per ratepayer is 6.95 miles per 1000 consumers inside the City and 25.96 miles per 1000 consumers outside the City. Since density, age and overhead lines are correlated with lower cost, the cost per kWh increases with levels of higher usage, irrespective of load factors.

Because of the cost impacts of high density, older equipment, and less undergrounding, consumers with low demand and lower costs should still have lower account charges, implemented on a tiered basis. Even if demand meters are deployed and demand costs allocated on the basis of measured demand, those consumers' lower costs will persist and should be recognized. Further, the cost of smart meters should be treated as a demand related cost, since spending money on the more expensive meter is intended to improve energy efficiency and lower distribution costs, by (among other things)

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<sup>1</sup> My direct testimony (City-CUB Ex. 1.0 at 30) explained my use of this proxy.

287 measuring and displaying demand to consumers. If ComEd cannot recognize the cost  
288 differences attributable to usage and demand differences in its rates, one wonders why  
289 new meters are being installed, since without proper recognition of costs in rates,  
290 sophisticated, hourly measurements and displays will not help consumers.

291 Third, a significant portion of my direct testimony discussed the unreasonableness  
292 of ComEd's conclusion that customer related and metering costs add up to more than  
293 50% of the total cost of serving multi-family ratepayers. ComEd achieves this result by  
294 including the costs of market research, stolen electricity, reconnecting ratepayers,  
295 providing technical services to ratepayers, relocating facilities, regulatory strategy, and  
296 administrative costs, as well as costs associated with ratepayer moves, ratepayer  
297 complaints, and billing system software bells and whistles in its calculation of customer  
298 costs. ComEd then allocates these costs on the basis of the number of accounts, implying  
299 that if a house is divided from a single family home into a duplex, all of these costs  
300 would increase. With respect to (a) the cost effects of ratepayer density, equipment age,  
301 and undergrounding or (b) actual cost causation for costs of consumer complaints,  
302 ratepayer moves, stolen electricity etc., ComEd fails to address these important factors.

303 **RESPONSE TO REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF MS. CHRISTINE BRINKMAN**


304 **Q. At lines 74-84 of her rebuttal, Ms. Brinkman defends the ComEd usage study**  
305 **(ComEd Exhibit 2.33) because it uses "extensive data" and "includes four charts"**  
306 **for "each of several hundred zip codes." Is her defense of the study valid?**

307 **A.** No. It is true that ComEd presented a lot of data and charts in its Exhibit 2.33. However,  
308 given the propositions the Company is attempting to support – e.g., that bigger homes do

309 not have both more usage and peak demand than smaller houses – the manner in which  
310 ComEd analyzed the data fails to support those propositions. ComEd has thrown  
311 together a lot of data, then asserted that there is no relationship between usage and  
312 demand, a conclusion supported only by anecdotal stories about vacation homes or  
313 people moving and leaving a house or apartment with low electricity usage during a  
314 vacancy period. ComEd offers such anecdotes about outliers (e.g. vacation homes) as  
315 proof of its propositions for a much larger universe of ratepayers. That approach cannot  
316 be accepted as an objective analysis.


317         Since submitting my direct testimony, I have been able to analyze in detail a more  
318 complete collection of ComEd’s usage data and load research data. When objective  
319 statistical analyses rather than anecdotal anomalies are used, there is no empirical basis  
320 upon which it is possible to conclude that any actual usage or demand whatsoever is  
321 related to the presence of a customer account. That key conclusion of this report is  
322 illustrated in the two graphs below. (My analysis is described in detail in City/CUB  
323 Exhibit 2.1 titled **Correlation Between Usage and Demand**.) The first graph compares  
324 residential consumer usage over the year to usage in the peak month of August by small  
325 10 kWh increments of usage. The graph illustrates two key facts that confirm no usage  
326 can be attributed to the presence consumer accounts. First, the correlation of 99% is very  
327 high, suggesting there is little to be explained by anything else. Second, usage does not  
328 cross the y-axis at a positive level, which would occur if some peak demand were  
329 correlated to the mere existence of a factor (like the number of consumer accounts)  
330 independent of usage. Exhibit 2.1 explains in detail how the analysis was developed and  
331 why the conclusions are appropriate.

332 **FIGURE - CORRELATION OF USAGE AND PEAK MONTH DEMAND**



333 The second graph below applies load research data to compare usage during the  
334 coincident peak hour for the ComEd system to average usage for larger, 100 kWh  
335 increments of usage. As with the above graph, this second graph shows a very high  
336 correlation of 97%, suggesting there is little to be explained by factors other than usage.  
337 Further, the second graph also does not cross the y-axis at a positive level, which would  
338 occur if some of the coincident peak demand was correlated to the mere existence of a  
339 consumer account, independent of usage.

340 **FIGURE - CORRELATION OF USAGE AND COINCIDENT PEAK DEMAND**



341 **Q. When commenting on your testimony at lines 152-157 Ms. Brinkman implies that**  
342 **your proposals are not cost based. Is this characterization of your testimony**  
343 **correct?**

344 **A.** No, this characterization is completely false. I repeatedly testified that low use  
345 residential consumers have lower costs than high use consumers. That testimony  
346 included an illustrative recounting of observations made with my Uncle Gerald, an  
347 analysis (using ComEd's own data) correlating distribution cost responsibility with usage  
348 (sometimes using City/non-City costs to show the relationship of costs for low/high usage  
349 ratepayers), and a demonstration that because of the density of City of Chicago ratepayers  
350 (compared to other regions) the miles of lines per ratepayer (a portion of their cost  
351 responsibility) are dramatically lower in the City than outside of the City. One of the



352 numbers that demonstrated the dramatic, lower cost is cost responsibility in terms of cost  
353 per ratepayer. That cost responsibility is only 6.95 miles per 1000 ratepayers for  
354 distribution lines inside the City while it is 25.96 miles per ratepayer outside of the City;  
355 those lower costs should result in lower prices for low users. In terms of the cost  
356 responsibility of poles, the numbers are similar. There are .81 poles per ratepayer in the  
357 City while there are 2.85 poles per ratepayer outside of the City, even though there is  
358 more undergrounding in the outside City regions. These cost differences are reflected in  
359 my tiered customer charge proposal.


360 **Q. Even though your proposal is cost based, could there be factors that could over-ride**  
361 **the results of a cost analysis when designing rates?**

362 A. Yes. It is clear from a review of rate designs for other utility companies in the U.S. that  
363 policy considerations involving encouragement of energy efficiency and distributed  
364 generation sometimes take a front seat. For example, the excerpt of a consumer bill on  
365 the website of Southern California Edison<sup>2</sup> shows that if you use higher amounts of  
366 electricity your bill dramatically increases – much more than in my tiered customer  
367 charge proposal. In the delivery charges section of that bill, the account charge is only  
368 .67 cents per month. The energy charge for the first 313 kWh per month is \$.0390 per  
369 kWh. It then jumps to \$.07087 per kWh for the next 94 kWh and it leaps to \$.18204 per  
370 kWh for the remaining kWh used. If I had this rate structure I would be obsessive about  
371 turning off the lights, keeping the air conditioner off as much as possible, buying  
372 appliances that do not waste electricity, and efficiently using my clothes dryer.

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.sce.com/wps/portal/home/residential/rates/!ut/p/b1/p>

373 FIGURE - SoCAL EDISON BILL EXCERPT




374 Q. Can you compare the rate design for Southern California Edison delivery service  
375 rates to ComEd's rate design, in terms of encouragement of energy efficiency and  
376 regressiveness?

377 A. Yes. To evaluate the structure of rates for different utilities, compared to ComEd's, I  
378 have computed the electric bill per kWh for various levels of usage. I made this  
379 calculation for the ComEd single family rate and for the corresponding residential rate of  
380 the comparison companies. After computing the average price per kWh at various levels  
381 of usage, I evaluated the total level of revenues generated by the rate design of the  
382 comparison company and compared it to the level of revenues generated by ComEd's  
383 rate design. The delivery service tariff components of the comparison company (in this

384 case Southern California Edison) were then increased or decreased so that I could present  
385 graphs that focus on the slope of the price curve. Further details of my calculations are  
386 described in City/CUB Exhibit 2.2

387         The graph below compares the rate designs for ComEd and for Southern  
388 California Edison. It shows that while ComEd has a very steep downward sloping curve  
389 (lower price at higher usage), the Southern California Edison curve is upward sloping  
390 (higher price at higher usage). The curve for Southern California Edison strongly  
391 encourages energy conservation, roof-top solar power installation and other energy  
392 efficiency measures, while the ComEd rate design does the opposite. Given the  
393 detrimental effects on the environment from generation, transmission, and distribution of  
394 electricity, as well as the mandates on energy efficiency from the State Legislature, there  
395 is little doubt that most serious policy makers would support the Southern California  
396 Edison structure rather than the ComEd structure. Finally, the shape of the Southern  
397 California Edison structure corresponds to cost of service patterns for ComEd, as shown  
398 by the usage to density, age, overhead lines, and cost correlations discussed above.

399 **FIGURE - PRICE CURVE COMPARISON**



400 City/CUB Exhibit 2.2 includes a similar graph for each utility company that serves one of  
 401 the largest 20 metropolitan areas in the U.S. Comparing the slope of the ComEd single  
 402 family rate to that of each of the other companies, not one utility company has a steeper  
 403 downward sloping price curve than ComEd. In each and every case shown in City/CUB  
 404 Exhibit2.2, the red line for ComEd has a steeper downward slope than the comparison  
 405 utility. It is from this consistently steeper downward slope that I conclude that ComEd  
 406 should receive a solid “F” grade in terms of encouraging energy efficiency. This  
 407 certainly conflicts with the energy efficiency objectives of the State Legislature. Further,

given the fact that income is closely correlated with usage, one can also state that ComEd has the most regressive rate structure.

**Q. At lines 164-179 of her testimony Ms. Brinkman complains that ComEd's revenues are not absolutely fixed and guaranteed. What does her statement signify to you?**

A. Ms. Brinkman's statement reveals why ComEd would design rates that have the effect of making electric bills to low income and low use ratepayers as high as possible. Given how her statement reveals ComEd's objectives, I have repeated it below.

EIMA in no way assures ComEd's full revenue requirement will be recovered. An appropriate cost allocation and rate design [i.e. SFV] will provide ComEd with a better opportunity to recover its Commission approved revenue requirement....Mr. Bodmer's claim fails to acknowledge that EIMA, by its own terms, contains sunset provisions. Consequently, even if EIMA ensured *revenue stability* – and it does not – EIMA does not provide the *long-term revenue stability* that Mr. Bodmer claims. (emphasis added)

This statement is very informative; it allows the Commission to understand the Company's motivations in rate design and cost allocation. First, ComEd's ratepayers should not have to endure unjust and unreasonable rates for a decade simply because of ComEd's fear that its formula rates will not be extended. Second, any pretense about rate design being a "zero sum game" about which ComEd is neutral is false. Similarly, any statement that ComEd is indifferent to various rate designs as long as it can collect its revenues is also false. (See the direct testimonies of Ms. Brinkman and Mr. Tenorio.)

It is important that the Commission fully understand the implications of Ms. Brinkman's testimony and how the Company's revenue stability objective creeps into all areas of its cost of service study and rate design recommendations. ComEd's ECOSS has thousands of costs, allocation factors, functionalization routines, and other items. The

434 data come from many more thousands of detailed account entries in the ComEd books,  
435 where classification of costs for accounting can be quite subjective. Given ComEd's  
436 corporate objective to reduce risk, it is not at all surprising that so much of its cost of  
437 service ends up in "customer related" items that are allocated to the customer charge. For  
438 example, a lot of the consulting fee paid to ComEd's consultant Mr. Hanser to respond to  
439 my testimony would end up in the customer charge. Similarly, the cost of preparing  
440 ComEd's Exhibit 2.33, which attempts to prove that usage and demand are not correlated,  
441 will also end up in the customer charge.

442 ComEd performs all of the accounting that produces costs that end up in the  
443 ECOSS the company performs, and ComEd controls all of the data. Given Ms.  
444 Brinkman's expression of the ComEd corporate perspective on revenue stability, the  
445 Commission cannot reasonably assume that ComEd's subjective decisions in recording  
446 and allocating costs will be objective. It is more likely (if one assumes ComEd will act in  
447 its economic interests) that any time the Company can call a cost "customer related" it  
448 will. When the Company's analysis suggests that 50% of the costs for multifamily  
449 ratepayers are related to metering and "customer care," the Company's bias in favor of a  
450 customer related designation for its costs becomes clear. Given ComEd's corporate  
451 objective, it is not surprising that the company has such a regressive rate design. This  
452 means that even if the SFV is rejected, ComEd will remain an outlier because of other  
453 policies that push costs into the "fixed" category that it treats as "customer related."

454 Through Ms. Brinkman's statement, the Company has revealed a desire be  
455 virtually risk free. From ComEd's perspective, allocating demand/distribution costs on  
456 the basis of customer accounts (notwithstanding the absence of any correlation) allows the

457 utility to claim that its rates are cost based, while gaining more revenue assurance.  
458 ComEd already earns a very hefty risk premium of about 6% in its formula rates, despite  
459 the assurances of formula rates and revenue requirement reconciliations. The question  
460 raised by Ms. Brinkman's testimony is whether the Commission must also adopt a rate  
461 design policy that dramatically discourages energy efficiency to provide even more  
462 certainty for ComEd. I hope that as a reasoned arbiter, the Commission will focus instead  
463 on actual cost of service responsibility and policy considerations important to ratepayers  
464 and society, rather than further assuring ComEd's revenue stream.

465 Before considering revenue stability objectives, I believe the Commission should  
466 make sure that the rate structure (1) corresponds to cost of service (where cost of service  
467 recognizes the effects of density, age and other factors); (2) does not discriminate against  
468 low income consumers, and (3) does not discourage the energy efficiency mandated by  
469 State Legislature policy. As demonstrated in my direct testimony, my tiered customer  
470 charge proposal (which does not increase usage charges relative to ComEd's rate design)  
471 advances these three objectives -- cost-based rates, non-regressive rate design, and  
472 encouraging energy efficiency -- while accommodating ComEd's revenue stability  
473 objective.

**RESPONSE TO REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF MR. CHARLES TENORIO**

**Q. Does Mr. Tenorio seem to understand your proposal?**

A. No, it appears that he does not understand at all what I am proposing. One example of his misunderstanding of my testimony occurs at lines 106-107 of his rebuttal, where Mr. Tenorio wrote:

“[I]t appears that Mr. Bodmer proposes to significantly lower customer charges for **all** residential customers.” (emphasis added)

Later, at lines 250-253, he makes this statement:

From his testimony, it appears that Mr. Bodmer opposes the use of the 50/50 SFV rate design and favors a rate design with much lower fixed charges and higher variable charges, which would result in overall unitized per kWh charges that are lower for low use customers (City/CUB 45:672-673). (emphasis added)

Mr. Tenorio’s comments make me scratch my head. Over and over again, I stated that my proposal involves restructuring the fixed account charges to address ComEd’s revenue stability concerns while basically leaving energy charges alone. The only change in the energy charge involved changes to reflect a re-allocation of costs that ComEd’s defines as “customer related” Other than this minor change, which increased the energy charge in the single family class and reduced the energy charge in the multi-family class, my proposed changes were all in the structure of the fixed account charge. I stated that my proposal changes the customer charge and not the energy charge at the following places in my direct testimony:

Line 132: “I propose a cost-based, revenue neutral, set of tiered monthly customer charges that vary to recognize the correlation between usage and key cost drivers.”

Line 140: “The customer charge would continue to gradually increase for each 100 kWh per month increment in prior year average monthly usage.... The break-even occurs at a usage level of 750 kWh per month.”



Line 149: “The total dollar amount collected from customer charges in my proposal would be exactly the same as the amounts collected using the current rate design. The only differences are (1) that revenues from customer charges would be collected from graduated charges rather than a uniform charge and (2) the allocation of costs that ComEd treats as customer related is corrected.”

Line 1339: “The data and my analyses show that low-users have characteristics that make the simple structure of a single account charge and a single energy charge inequitable and demonstrate that ComEd’s rate design must be restructured to include a graduated account charge.”

Line 1359: “Use billing determinants separated by usage increment to derive a series of customer charges that produce the same level of revenues ....”

If Mr. Tenorio could not understand my proposal from the above references in my direct testimony, he could have looked at City/CUB Exhibit 1.1. There I showed that customer charges could rise to almost \$60 per month for the highest use ratepayers and that the energy charge would not change. I have included a couple of excerpts that demonstrate this below:

FIGURE - CUSTOMER CHARGE/ENERGY CHARGE REVENUES SPLIT

Step 4: Split Total Revenues Between Customer Charge and Energy Charge

		Single Family w/o Space Heat	Multi Family w/o Space Heat	Single Family w/ Space Heat	Multi Family w/ Space Heat	Total Residential
ComEd Desired Customer and Meter Charge	USD/Month	18.21	10.97	20.30	11.94	
Bills	Number	26,785,836	12,498,048	419,988	1,912,188	
Total	USD	487,770,074	137,103,587	8,525,756	22,831,525	656,230,941
Reduced from Re-allocation	USD		(54,725,949)			
Net Collections	USD	487,770,074	82,377,638	8,525,756	22,831,525	656,230,941
Collections from Energy Charge	USD	528,696,458	134,334,856	15,393,552	27,418,047	705,842,914
Energy	kWh	20,471,628,554	4,425,830,554	750,453,895	1,593,009,493	0
Energy Charge	USD/kWh	0.0258	0.0304	0.0205	0.0172	
ComEd Energy Charge	USD/kWh	0.0238	0.0310	0.0114	0.0143	

520 FIGURE - RANGE OF POSSIBLE TIERED CUSTOMER CHARGES

Single Family Non-Space Heat Usage Increment Calculations

kWh Increment	Evaluated Charge	Customer Charge	Rate Counter	Rate Adjustment	Customer Cng Rev Single Family w/o Space Heat	kWh Single Family w/o Space Heat	Single Family w/o Space Heat	Usage Increment	Reason/Revised kWh	
30	FA1M	1.00	-	FA1M	1.00	1,120,113.00	32,029,320.91	1,340,441.19	50.00	0.04186
130	FA1M	1.00	-	FA1M	1.00	1,280,111.24	37,980,286.24	4,820,130.45	130.00	0.04184
230	FA1M	1.00	-	FA1M	1.00	1,394,109.64	40,066,728.49	11,806,900.92	230.00	0.04182
330	FA1M	1.00	-	FA1M	1.00	1,466,090.93	40,400,888.39	20,815,817.66	330.00	0.04181
430	FA1M	5.21	1.00	1.31	1.00	15,379,188.88	1,090,012,071.25	18,475,184.75	430.00	0.04180
530	FA1M	9.29	3.00	1.31	1.00	20,273,446.28	1,278,111,520.11	11,388,317.65	530.00	0.04179
630	FA1M	13.87	3.00	1.39	1.00	25,418,713.58	1,393,096,763.46	14,340,911.15	630.00	0.04177
730	FA1M	18.78	4.00	1.39	1.00	30,653,173.79	1,549,186,230.13	14,846,096.58	730.00	0.04175
830	FA1M	29.43	5.00	1.33	1.00	35,796,354.28	1,730,215,450.64	15,634,540.61	830.00	0.04170
930	FA1M	35.98	6.00	1.38	1.00	40,444,359.84	1,875,611,957.30	16,638,675.12	930.00	0.04112
1030	FA1M	37.49	7.00	1.49	1.00	45,477,304.84	1,984,912,758.41	17,807,846.15	1,030.00	0.04144
1130	FA1M	38.96	8.00	1.81	1.00	50,636,483.88	2,098,186,848.76	18,807,388.79	1,130.00	0.04181
1230	FA1M	38.98	9.00	1.86	1.00	55,331,170.10	2,215,415,161.69	19,370,811.68	1,230.00	0.04117
1330	FA1M	37.37	10.00	1.89	1.00	59,793,481.79	2,332,132,580.47	21,046,134.01	1,330.00	0.04068
1430	FA1M	35.12	11.00	1.84	1.00	63,981,122.01	2,450,000,420.21	21,596,880.08	1,430.00	0.04080
1530	FA1M	33.09	12.00	1.83	1.00	68,311,728.28	2,569,112,228.28	11,805,141.88	1,530.00	0.04041
1630	FA1M	31.79	13.00	1.81	1.00	72,902,118.28	2,689,628,884.93	11,570,718.11	1,630.00	0.04111
1730	FA1M	31.81	14.00	1.81	1.00	77,699,568.77	2,811,611,109.41	11,838,677.13	1,730.00	0.04176
1830	FA1M	34.28	15.00	1.81	1.00	82,113,117.79	2,936,346,090.30	12,357,991.04	1,830.00	0.04176
1930	FA1M	33.52	16.00	1.88	1.00	86,824,906.84	3,062,122,550.77	12,874,651.26	1,930.00	0.04171
2030	FA1M	33.52	17.00	FA1M	1.00	91,612,812.92	3,189,552,222.42	13,022,644.02	2,030.00	0.04117
2130	FA1M	33.52	18.00	FA1M	1.00	96,412,812.92	3,318,979,699.82	12,996,931.10	2,130.00	0.04146
2230	FA1M	33.52	19.00	FA1M	1.00	1,01,244,812.92	3,449,412,127.84	12,988,877.86	2,230.00	0.04147
2330	FA1M	33.52	20.00	FA1M	1.00	1,06,114,812.92	3,580,851,586.29	12,955,141.78	2,330.00	0.04130
2430	FA1M	33.52	21.00	FA1M	1.00	1,11,024,812.92	3,713,297,124.21	12,908,540.41	2,430.00	0.04111
2530	FA1M	33.52	22.00	FA1M	1.00	1,15,964,812.92	3,846,751,734.61	12,850,517.01	2,530.00	0.04012
2630	FA1M	33.52	23.00	FA1M	1.00	1,20,934,812.92	3,981,217,479.67	12,781,894.66	2,630.00	0.04190
2730	FA1M	33.52	24.00	FA1M	1.00	1,25,934,812.92	4,116,694,267.13	12,698,112.66	2,730.00	0.04041
2830	FA1M	33.52	25.00	FA1M	1.00	1,30,964,812.92	4,253,181,100.48	12,602,491.48	2,830.00	0.04191
2930	FA1M	33.52	26.00	FA1M	1.00	1,36,024,812.92	4,390,679,988.64	12,498,688.11	2,930.00	0.04041
3030	FA1M	33.52	27.00	FA1M	1.00	1,41,114,812.92	4,529,697,924.62	12,386,111.65	3,030.00	0.04041
3130	FA1M	33.52	28.00	FA1M	1.00	1,46,234,812.92	4,670,236,909.19	12,264,179.27	3,130.00	0.04017
3230	FA1M	33.52	29.00	FA1M	1.00	1,51,384,812.92	4,812,297,942.27	12,134,174.71	3,230.00	0.04017
3330	FA1M	33.52	30.00	FA1M	1.00	1,56,564,812.92	4,955,879,024.50	11,998,174.15	3,330.00	0.04017
3430	FA1M	33.52	31.00	FA1M	1.00	1,61,774,812.92	5,100,481,156.82	11,858,171.18	3,430.00	0.04016
3530	FA1M	33.52	32.00	FA1M	1.00	1,67,014,812.92	5,246,112,339.13	11,714,166.12	3,530.00	0.04012
3630	FA1M	33.52	33.00	FA1M	1.00	1,72,284,812.92	5,392,763,471.44	11,566,158.15	3,630.00	0.04017
3730	FA1M	33.52	34.00	FA1M	1.00	1,77,584,812.92	5,540,534,553.75	11,414,146.18	3,730.00	0.04011
3830	FA1M	33.52	35.00	FA1M	1.00	1,82,914,812.92	5,689,425,586.06	11,258,128.21	3,830.00	0.04011
3930	FA1M	33.52	36.00	FA1M	1.00	1,88,274,812.92	5,839,436,568.37	11,098,109.24	3,930.00	0.04011
4030	FA1M	33.52	37.00	FA1M	1.00	1,93,664,812.92	5,990,566,500.68	10,934,089.27	4,030.00	0.04011
4130	FA1M	33.52	38.00	FA1M	1.00	1,99,084,812.92	6,142,814,382.99	10,766,069.30	4,130.00	0.04011
4230	FA1M	33.52	39.00	FA1M	1.00	2,04,534,812.92	6,296,180,715.30	10,594,049.33	4,230.00	0.04011
4330	FA1M	33.52	40.00	FA1M	1.00	2,10,014,812.92	6,450,666,507.61	10,418,029.36	4,330.00	0.04011
4430	FA1M	33.52	41.00	FA1M	1.00	2,15,524,812.92	6,606,271,750.92	10,238,009.39	4,430.00	0.04011
4530	FA1M	33.52	42.00	FA1M	1.00	2,21,064,812.92	6,762,996,454.23	10,054,989.42	4,530.00	0.04011
4630	FA1M	33.52	43.00	FA1M	1.00	2,26,734,812.92	6,920,830,608.54	9,868,969.45	4,630.00	0.04011
4730	FA1M	33.52	44.00	FA1M	1.00	2,32,434,812.92	7,079,274,212.85	9,679,949.48	4,730.00	0.04011
4830	FA1M	33.52	45.00	FA1M	1.00	2,38,164,812.92	7,238,327,267.16	9,487,929.51	4,830.00	0.04011
4930	FA1M	33.52	46.00	FA1M	1.00	2,43,924,812.92	7,397,989,771.47	9,293,909.54	4,930.00	0.04011
5030	FA1M	33.52	47.00	FA1M	1.00	2,49,714,812.92	7,558,261,825.78	9,097,889.57	5,030.00	0.04011
5130	FA1M	33.52	48.00	FA1M	1.00	2,55,524,812.92	7,719,143,330.09	8,899,869.60	5,130.00	0.04011
5230	FA1M	33.52	49.00	FA1M	1.00	2,61,354,812.92	7,880,234,284.40	8,699,849.63	5,230.00	0.04011
5330	FA1M	33.52	50.00	FA1M	1.00	2,67,204,812.92	8,041,534,688.71	8,497,829.66	5,330.00	0.04011
5430	FA1M	33.52	51.00	FA1M	1.00	2,73,074,812.92	8,203,045,043.02	8,293,809.69	5,430.00	0.04011
5530	FA1M	33.52	52.00	FA1M	1.00	2,78,964,812.92	8,364,765,347.33	8,087,789.72	5,530.00	0.04011
5630	FA1M	33.52	53.00	FA1M	1.00	2,84,874,812.92	8,526,695,601.64	7,879,769.75	5,630.00	0.04011
5730	FA1M	33.52	54.00	FA1M	1.00	2,90,804,812.92	8,688,835,805.95	7,669,749.78	5,730.00	0.04011
5830	FA1M	33.52	55.00	FA1M	1.00	2,96,754,812.92	8,851,185,960.26	7,457,729.81	5,830.00	0.04011
5930	FA1M	33.52	56.00	FA1M	1.00	3,02,724,812.92	9,013,746,064.57	7,243,709.84	5,930.00	0.04011
6030	FA1M	33.52	57.00	FA1M	1.00	3,08,714,812.92	9,176,416,118.88	7,027,689.87	6,030.00	0.04011
6130	FA1M	33.52	58.00	FA1M	1.00	3,14,724,812.92	9,339,196,173.19	6,809,669.90	6,130.00	0.04011
6230	FA1M	33.52	59.00	FA1M	1.00	3,20,754,812.92	9,502,086,227.50	6,589,649.93	6,230.00	0.04011
6330	FA1M	33.52	60.00	FA1M	1.00	3,26,804,812.92	9,665,086,281.81	6,367,629.96	6,330.00	0.04011
6430	FA1M	33.52	61.00	FA1M	1.00	3,32,874,812.92	9,828,196,336.12	6,143,609.99	6,430.00	0.04011
6530	FA1M	33.52	62.00	FA1M	1.00	3,38,964,812.92	9,991,416,390.43	5,917,589.02	6,530.00	0.04011
6630	FA1M	33.52	63.00	FA1M	1.00	3,45,074,812.92	10,154,746,444.74	5,689,569.05	6,630.00	0.04011
6730	FA1M	33.52	64.00	FA1M	1.00	3,51,204,812.92	10,318,186,499.05	5,459,549.08	6,730.00	0.04011
6830	FA1M	33.52	65.00	FA1M	1.00	3,57,354,812.92	10,481,736,553.36	5,227,529.11	6,830.00	0.04011
6930	FA1M	33.52	66.00	FA1M	1.00	3,63,524,812.92	10,645,396,607.67	5,000,509.14	6,930.00	0.04011
7030	FA1M	33.52	67.00	FA1M	1.00	3,69,714,812.92	10,809,166,661.98	4,767,489.17	7,030.00	0.04011
7130	FA1M	33.52	68.00	FA1M	1.00	3,75,924,812.92	10,973,036,716.29	4,528,469.20	7,130.00	0.04011
7230	FA1M	33.52	69.00	FA1M	1.00	3,82,154,812.92	11,137,016,770.60	4,283,449.23	7,230.00	0.04011
7330	FA1M	33.52	70.00	FA1M	1.00	3,88,404,812.92	11,301,106,824.91	4,032,429.26	7,330.00	0.04011
7430	FA1M	33.52	71.00	FA1M	1.00	3,94,674,812.92	11,465,306,879.22	3,775,409.29	7,430.00	0.04011
7530	FA1M	33.52	72.00	FA1M	1.00	4,00,964,812.92	11,629,616,933.53	3,512,389.32	7,530.00	0.04011
7630	FA1M	33.52	73.00	FA1M	1.00	4,07,274,812.92	11,794,036,987.84	3,243,369.35	7,630.00	0.04011
7730	FA1M	33.52	74.00	FA1M	1.00	4,13,604,812.92	11,958,567,042.15	2,968,349.38	7,730.00	0.04011
7830	FA1M	33.52	75.00	FA1M	1.00	4,19,954,812.92	12,123,207,096.46	2,687,329.41	7,830.00	0.04011
7930	FA1M	33.52	76.00	FA1M	1.00	4,26,324,812.92	12,287,957,150.77	2,400,309.44	7,930.00	0.04011
8030	FA1M	33.52	77.00	FA1M	1.00	4,32,714,812.92	12,452,817,205.08	2,107,289.47	8,030.00	0.04011
8130	FA1M	33.52	78.00	FA1M	1.00	4,39,124,812.92	12,617,787,259.39	1,808,269.50	8,130.00	0.04011
8230	FA1M	33.52	79.00	FA1M	1.00	4,45,554,812.92	12,782,867,313.70	1,503,249.53	8,230.00	0.04011
8330	FA1M	33.52	80.00	FA1M	1.00	4,52,004,812.92	12,948,057,368.01	1,192,229.56	8,330.00	0.04011
8430	FA1M	33.52	81.00	FA1M	1.00	4,58,474,812.92	13,113,357,422.32	887,209.59	8,430.00	0.04011
8530	FA1M	33.52	82.00	FA1M	1.00	4,64,96				

**this finding surprising or important, with respect to whether distribution costs should be priced on the basis of the number of accounts?**

A. Not at all. Much of the residential usage study presents tables and charts that show that zip codes can have both high and low usage accounts in a particular month. Mr. Tenorio apparently thinks this is so important that he has copied and pasted statements and tables related to the variation in usage from Exhibit 2.33 into his rebuttal testimony. Among the statements that he copied were the following (lines 329 to 334):

“[I]n comparing the lowest to the highest percentile customers . . . there were numerous instances in which the address for a customer in Percentile 1 was in the same hundred block and street as the address for a customer in Percentile 100. For some multi-family accounts there were Percentile 1 customers literally either across the hall or next door to Percentile 100 customers.”


After copying this statement from the usage study, Mr. Tenorio presents a table showing that many zip codes had consumers in both the lowest percentile and the highest percentile.

When looking at the table and reading the ComEd statements, one would think that it is common in the Chicago area to see mansions located next to apartment buildings where low-income/low use consumers live. Alternatively, ComEd seems to imply that a studio apartment in the City can suddenly use as much electricity as a large home in Kenilworth and ComEd needs to prepare for that possibility. Because he believes a studio apartment can suddenly use as much energy as a large mansion, Mr. Tenorio asserts that energy usage does not drive distribution cost. In fact, ComEd’s analysis of variation in usage does not really demonstrate anything at all. ComEd has misinterpreted its own data and derived incorrect conclusions.

- 550 ➤ The probable reason that usage varies in the way ComEd reports is that people take  
551 vacations and people move. When the neighbor of a high user living in a large  
552 mansion in Lake Forest moves or the home-owning family takes a trip to Paris, the  
553 usage next door can suddenly fall to almost nothing. City/CUB Exhibit 2.1, in the  
554 section titled “Sudden Changes in Usage and Demand from Consumer Vacancies and  
555 the Load Research Data,” examines the load research data to demonstrate how the  
556 load of a single family home or an apartment can suddenly fall because of moving  
557 and/or vacations.
- 558 ➤ When people move or take vacations and the usage at an address declines for a  
559 particular month, this in no way implies that peak demand and distribution costs can  
560 be correlated with the presence of a ratepayer account rather than usage. If a family  
561 living in a large mansion takes a vacation, that home still requires more distribution  
562 equipment than a studio apartment that is vacant because the former renter has moved  
563 out. I discuss this point in a more formal way in City/CUB Exhibit 2.1 and present a  
564 proof that vacation homes and vacancies from residents moving do not affect the  
565 basic correlation and relationship between usage and demand.
- 566 ➤ In discussing its finding that zip codes can have both high and low usage residents,  
567 ComEd suggests that usage in a particular region can vary dramatically. Data  
568 provided by ComEd demonstrate that this is not the case for the City and outside  
569 regions of the service territory. The four graphs below that compare the City and  
570 outside City usage distributions for 2006, 2010, 2011 and 2012 (years of data  
571 provided by ComEd). Data for the four different years demonstrate that the  
572 relationship between usage and regions is very stable and that the City has a

consistent pattern relative to other parts of the service territory. The City consistently has lower usage than the outside City (of course there are some high users in the City which seems to be a big deal for ComEd). As with the other points, the stability of usage is discussed in City/CUB Exhibit 2.1.

FIGURE - REGIONAL USAGE COMPARISONS



➤ Finally and most importantly, if ComEd truly wants to assess the relationship between usage and demand, ComEd does not have to go further than directly performing a correlation analysis. It does not need any of the percentile analysis presented by Mr. Tenorio. A proper correlation analysis, which is fully described in City/CUB Exhibit 2.1 and summarized in the two correlation graphs above,

demonstrates that ComEd's finding regarding variation in use does not have any meaningful effect on the larger issue of the relationship between usage and peak demand.

**Q. The main focus of Mr. Tenorio's rebuttal to your direct testimony regarding the usage-demand correlation appears to center on load factors. Is that testimony relevant to the cost allocation and recovery issues you raised?**

A. No, it is not. Mr. Tenorio computes the load factors used in his analysis and testimony on an individual consumer basis (where, for example, the peak load of a particular consumer may occur in April or December). But peak loads for individual consumers have nothing at all to do with the class cost of service approach ComEd uses to set its rates. In ComEd's cost of service study, all primary facilities costs are allocated on the basis of coincident peak and certain other costs are allocated on the basis of load measured on a non-coincident, class-wide basis. These latter measures of peak load capture the effects of the diversity of ratepayer usage within a class. The peak loads of individual consumers are not comparable. Yet, Mr. Tenorio asserts that his analysis somehow invalidates my conclusions about the relationship between distribution cost of service and residential ratepayer usage. When Mr. Tenorio's analysis is corrected to reflect the coincident peak load factor or non-coincident peak load factors used in the study used to set its rate, the results provide no basis for his assertion that load factor increases with

usage. In fact, the coincident peak load factor for City residential ratepayers is 23% better than the outside City load factor, even though City rates are 18% higher.<sup>3</sup>

**Q. Please comment on Mr. Tenorio's load factor graphs, which seem to suggest that load factor improves (or usage becomes more efficient) as usage becomes larger?**

A. Those charts show a load factor trend line that increases with usage. In introducing his load factor charts, Mr. Tenorio presents a formula for the load factor. What Mr. Tenorio does not tell us is whether his load factor is computed on the basis of individual billing demand, coincident peak demand, or class demand. That choice is crucial in the definition and the interpretation of a load factor for rate design and rate setting purposes.

After going through Mr. Tenorio's workpapers, I have verified that he uses the demand of an individual consumer (no matter when her highest demand occurs) as the basis for defining peak load. This means that for one consumer the peak demand could occur in April, while for another the peak demand could occur in October. The relevant peak demand for purposes of cost causation, however, is only that occurring when the system (on a regional basis) reaches its peak. The peak demand used in allocating most costs in ComEd's ECOSS is the system peak. In City/CUB Exhibit 2.1, I explain that the load factors computed by Mr. Tenorio using individual instead of system or class peaks has no relevance whatsoever in the ComEd cost of service analysis. In that exhibit, I show the different dates of the individual peaks Mr. Tenorio uses to produce his graphs.

When the relevant load factors -- computed from coincident peak or from class peak -- are used in computing the load factor, the results are very different from those

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<sup>3</sup> As I explained in my direct testimony, given the available data, using the City as a proxy is an effective way to look at the cost characteristics of low use consumers.

623 presented by Mr. Tenorio. The most important load factor is calculated using coincident  
624 peak load, as it is the primary driver of cost allocations in ComEd's cost of service study.  
625 Implications of the different load factors are discussed in Exhibit 2.1, which explains why  
626 the coincident peak load factor is most relevant. Another possible load factor uses the  
627 class peak, but that load factor has much less to do with how actual demand/distribution  
628 costs are incurred, since they are driven by regional demand from all rate classes.  
629 ComEd's data show that, for the single family non space heat class, the class peak is  
630 virtually the same as the coincident peak -- it occurs one hour later. (The class load  
631 factor is used as a basis to allocate secondary costs in the ECOSS).


632 The least relevant load factor is the load factor computed by comparing the  
633 average usage of a consumer to his own peak use. This load factor ignores load diversity  
634 and any effect of diversity on ComEd's costs. Diversity is crucial in measuring costs for  
635 any ratepayer class, and it has always been a standard part of a cost of service analysis.  
636 The individual load factor is not used at all in ComEd's cost study. Yet, it is the one Mr.  
637 Tenorio chose to support his criticisms of my analysis. Using individual load factors in  
638 the context of this case serves no meaningful purpose. Mr. Tenorio's calculation merely  
639 diverts attention from the relevant facts, distorts the analysis of ComEd's cost and rates,  
640 and is irrelevant to the ECOSS and ComEd's rates.

641 In Exhibit 2.1, I present my computations of coincident peak load factors. In  
642 contrast to Mr. Tenorio's presentation, I explain (explicitly) the methodology for  
643 computing the load factors in City/CUB Exhibit 2.1. Load factor graphs shown in  
644 Exhibit 2.1 (and repeated below) demonstrate the following facts.




- 645 1. The coincident peak load factor for non-space heat consumers is higher inside the  
646 City of Chicago than outside the City of Chicago (in 2012 the coincident peak  
647 occurred at 5:00 PM on July 6th). For multi-family non-space heat consumers in  
648 the City it was 39.7% while it was 32.1% outside of the City. (Though ComEd  
649 did not have a reasonable sample of City consumers in the single family non-  
650 space heat class, the available data indicate that this City load factor also was  
651 higher.) The graph below illustrates the better load factor for multi-family  
652 consumers inside and outside the City of Chicago, as shown by the 2012 load  
653 research data provided by ComEd. A comprehensive set of graphs is included in  
654 City/CUB Exhibit 2.1. If one accepts the notion that distribution costs are driven  
655 by coincident peak demand -- as ComEd maintains -- this implies that rates  
656 should be 23% lower in the City of Chicago than outside city regions. Instead,  
657 actual residential prices for non-space consumers are 18% higher in the City than  
658 outside the City.

659 **FIGURE - CITY/NON-CITY COINCIDENT PEAK LOADS**




660 2. Based on the detailed 2010 usage data of more than a million accounts that was  
 661 provided in response to an AG data request at the same time as the load research  
 662 data, the load factor, as measured by highest monthly use relative to average use  
 663 over the year, is better for low use consumers until the use reaches about 500 kWh  
 664 per month. For monthly use above 800 kWh the load factor improves somewhat.  
 665 Although this load factor uses usage for the entire peak month to represent pea  
 666 load, it gives a much better indication of load factor than the statistic used by Mr.  
 667 Tenorio.

668 **FIGURE - RESIDENTIAL CONSUMER LOAD FACTORS**



669 3. The load factor measured using coincident peak load for groups of non-space heat  
670 residential consumers in ComEd's residential load research sample demonstrates  
671 that coincident peak load factor is high for very low users. The load factor  
672 declines until a usage level of about of 450 kWh per month and then increases  
673 somewhat. The difference in the two graphs is explained by use of a single peak  
674 number in the graph below and the sampling problems in ComEd's load research  
675 data. The serious problems with ComEd's sampling are described in detail in  
676 City/CUB Exhibit 2.1. The graph has a break for the lowest use category because  
677 its load factor is so much higher than the other load factors and exceeds the  
678 maximum vertical axis value.

679 **FIGURE - RESIDENTIAL LOAD FACTORS BY USAGE LEVEL**



680 **Q. Is Mr. Tenorio’s assertion that you rely on load factors to make the argument that**  
681 **low users have lower cost a correct?**

682 A. Not at all. Mr. Tenorio states that I “appear to rely heavily on [my] often repeated  
683 opinion that ‘low usage is closely correlated with... better load factors.’” Once again,  
684 this statement suggests that Mr. Tenorio did not read or understand my testimony. Load  
685 factor was only one of the items I examined that drive ComEd’s distribution costs.  
686 Immediately after discussing load factor in my direct testimony, I presented statistical  
687 data on the correlations between density, age and undergrounding relative to usage. The  
688 data demonstrated that distribution cost responsibility per residential consumer for  
689 overhead lines and underground lines is less for low use regions than for high use  
690 regions. In measuring the cost responsibility per region for distribution facilities, the

691 level of peak demand and load factor does not come into the equation. Peak demand is  
692 used only for allocating costs among rate classes.

693 For years over the course of a number of rate cases, the City has tried to acquire  
694 data on the distribution costs per ratepayer for residential regions in the City of Chicago  
695 and analogous regions outside of the City. I understand from attending workshops that  
696 data on the age, quantity and cost of distribution facilities is available for very small  
697 regions of the service territory from the CGIS system. With this data we could measure,  
698 for example, the cost of serving consumers in Lake Forest and in Engelwood (using City  
699 of Chicago statistics on an aggregate basis is not useful for certain analyses because of  
700 distortions created by the Central Business District). If we could get this data – which is  
701 fully controlled by ComEd -- we could perform a detailed analysis of cost and usage and  
702 derive the cost per kWh for different usage level increments. This analysis would not  
703 require any information about ratepayer peak load, load factor or anything other than the  
704 cost and the usage. Unfortunately, ComEd once again refused to cooperate in such an  
705 analysis in this case as demonstrated by its non-response to data requests that attempted  
706 to obtain such data (see ComEd’s response to COC 3.03).

707 **Q. Mr. Tenorio states that your proposal is too complicated and “could cause confusion**  
708 **and consternation” for ratepayers. Can we compare your proposal to other**  
709 **proposals to evaluate whether his assertion is true?**

710 **A.** Mr. Tenorio’s claim is not true. Utilities frequently claim that any proposal other than  
711 their own will cause customer confusion and outrageous IT costs. Their own proposals  
712 are not scrutinized for similar effects. Here, my proposal would cause much less

713 consternation, at least among low use and low income ratepayers, than ComEd's Docket  
714 10-0467 proposal to increase customer charges to more than \$30 per month, which meant  
715 that rates for low use consumers would go up by 78%. That rate increase was on top of a  
716 big customer charge rate increase in the previous (2007) rate case. Before the 2007 case  
717 ComEd's multi-family customer charge was \$2.94 per month City Exhibit 1.0 --  
718 Corrected (Docket No. 07-0566 line 128). While a 78% increase would not cause much  
719 confusion for ratepayers, in my opinion it would certainly create consternation. As I  
720 wrote in my direct testimony, the actual increase in account charges caused an increase of  
721 54% in delivery charges of low use City ratepayers. A graduated account charge, on the  
722 other hand, has an understandable tie to a consumer's cost-causing demand, and the tiers  
723 would create an understandable mechanism by which consumers could clearly see the  
724 effects of their energy efficiency activities.

725 Mr. Tenorio also suggests that under my proposal customer charges would jump  
726 around and that there would be wide variations in delivery charges to ensure revenue  
727 neutrality. (Lines 305 to 307). One would have to read less than ten pages of my  
728 testimony to see the words on line 141, page 9 which make it clear that a moving average  
729 of usage is used, in part, to minimize fluctuations in bills:

730 'The customer charge would continue to gradually increase for  
731 each 100 kWh per month increment in **prior year average**  
732 **monthly usage.**' (emphasis added)

733 I also stated that the prior year moving average of usage could be weather  
734 normalized to address ComEd's revenue stability focus (see lines 1000-1001, 1081, 1097,  
735 1102 of my direct testimony). Using a 12-month rolling average will avoid peripatetic  
736 movement among tiers, and the tiers are graduated (every 100 kWh), so moving from one

737 tier to the next would not mean a dramatic change in charges. In addition, since the tiers  
738 are cost based, the signals to consumers will not spur excessive conservation or energy  
739 efficiency, which appears to be the pre-occupation of Mr. Hanser.

740 Mr. Tenorio's comment about the supposed difficulty of designing revenue  
741 neutral rates is needless hand wringing. Using ComEd billing determinants, I created a  
742 revenue neutral rate design, which was presented in my direct testimony. In City/CUB  
743 Exhibit 1.1, I used the ComEd provided billing determinants to assure that my proposal  
744 generates the same revenues as those produced by its own rate design. I have no doubt  
745 that the Company – which has hundreds, if not thousands, of rate elements in its tariffs  
746 for which it calculates charges and taxes -- could work out the relatively simple  
747 calculations necessary to implement my proposal.

748 **Q. Mr. Tenorio presents a number of charts and graphs that seem to suggest that**  
749 **implementation of the SFV system would lower customer charges for multi-family**  
750 **consumers. Does this make sense?**

751 **A.** Of course not. The whole idea of the SFV was to increase customer charges and reduce  
752 energy charges by moving distribution costs from the energy charge to the customer  
753 charge. If implementation of the SFV somehow reduces customer charges, then either  
754 (a) ComEd's "fixed" costs are not really fixed at low usage levels, (b) there was  
755 something wrong with the way in which ComEd implemented the SVF after the last case,  
756 or (c) both. Instead of presenting a whole lot of tables and charts, Mr. Tenorio should  
757 explain the odd result from the multi-family class. As shown in my direct testimony, the  
758 multi-family energy charge is lower than the single family energy charge and the